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Abstract: Ecological Economics inherently faces a challenge akin to sailing between Scylla and 
Charybdis. In Greek mythology these are two monsters located on opposite sides of a narrow 
strait, and falling victim to one or other of them is unavoidable. In the recurring process of 
establishing and refining its conceptual foundations, Ecological Economics runs the risk of, on 
the one hand, losing important insights by trying to be radically different from mainstream 
economics and, on the other hand, becoming a redundant appendix to mainstream environmental 
economics by routinely applying its concepts and methods. We argue that avoiding both fallacies 
is possible by using Ecological Economics’ orientation towards sustainability as a guiding 
principle. The scientist’s power of judgment supports her decision concerning which methods are 
suitable for tackling a given sustainability problem. The intersubjective quality of judgment 
prevents the resulting methodological pluralism from drifting toward arbitrariness.  
 
Keywords: ecological economics, methodological pluralism, power of judgment, ontology, 
sustainability  
 
1. Introduction 
“[…] a diversity of methodologies is appropriate and pressures to eliminate methodologies for 
the sake of conformity should be avoided” (Norgaard 1989: 37) 
Almost every other year, Ecological Economics (EE) is said to stand at a crossroads: Spash 
(1999), Müller (2003), Gowdy and Erickson (2005) and again Spash (2013: 351) have all 
asserted at regular intervals that EE is facing crucial choices: choices about what kind of science 
EE is and on what methodological, philosophical and ideological premises it should be based. 
But behind the more specific questions lies one fundamental issue: how should EE relate to 
mainstream economics? This question reflects a tension that has repeatedly shaped the history of 
modern EE (Røpke 2005). It is no wonder, then, that EE encounters the same crossroads again 
and again: how different should EE be compared to mainstream economics in terms of concepts, 
methods and their underlying premises? 
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So far, scholars working in EE have not found a unanimous answer to this question. Both 
supporters and resolute critics of mainstream methods have conducted research under the EE 
label. In practice, EE has displayed a wide methodological pluralism.1 Various approaches have 
been proposed for justifying (Norgaard 1989) or systemizing (Baumgärtner et al. 2008) this 
methodological pluralism in EE. Recently, however, it has also drawn heavy fire: Anderson and 
M’Gonigle (2012: 43) have argued that there is a “façade of methodological pluralism that masks 
[the] dominance [of neoclassical economics]”. Furthermore, Norgaard’s plea for methodological 
pluralism, cited above, has been attacked as “somewhat flawed” (Spash 2012: 45) in that, among 
other things, it delivers only “an argument against prescriptive epistemology [but] not the 
elimination of some methodologies per se” (ibid: 40). What these critics are proposing, then, is to 
retain a degree of methodological diversity within EE but also to structure and limit this pluralism 
in a way that excludes the bulk of mainstream economic methodology from EE. 
In this paper, we visit the crossroads once again, framing it as a challenge to navigate between 
two extremes which one would rather wish to avoid. On the one hand, in trying to be radically 
different from mainstream economics EE risks losing important insights and useful concepts. On 
the other hand, by routinely applying established economic concepts and methods it risks 
becoming a redundant appendix to mainstream economics.2 Hence the title’s reference to Scylla 
and Charybdis, the two monsters from Homer’s Odyssey located on opposite sides of a narrow 
strait: falling victim to one or the other is unavoidable. In the recurring process of establishing 
and refining its conceptual foundations, EE runs the risk of either inappropriately including or 
inappropriately excluding (parts of) mainstream methodology. This yields the obvious question: 
is there a way to avoid both dangers and, if so, how can it be done?  
We hope to advance the discussion in two steps. First, we contrast and analyze the two opposing 
lines of argument that lead to either fundamental rejection or unquestioned acceptance of 
mainstream methodology. In doing so, we demonstrate that both extremes rest on weak 
foundations. To be explicit here: we do not advocate a middle position for its own sake or merely 
in order to reconcile different factions. Rather, we show that there is no universally valid line of 
argument which proves mainstream methods per se to be correct or flawed. Second, we argue 
that EE is characterized by its focus on sustainability and that judgment is necessary to decide 
which methods are suitable for tackling a given sustainability problem. The eminent work of 
Kant (2000 [1790]) on the “power of judgment”, i.e. a person’s capacity to relate specific cases to 
general rules and categories, is helpful in clarifying the epistemological status of such 
methodological decisions based on judgment. Our perspective is thoroughly context-based and 
shares similarities with Pragmatic Philosophy (e.g. Bromley 2008), in that we treat mainstream 
                                                          
1 It is worth noting that not only EE as a whole but also a single study may exhibit and benefit from methodological 
pluralism (Nijar et al. 2010). 
2 Røpke (2005: 287) has already made a similar observation for EE: “One risk is that the field becomes uninteresting 
as a field, if identity is lost by the acceptance of anything as being justified because of transdisciplinarity. […] 
Another risk (others would call it a chance) is that the field loses its bite and becomes a sub-field of neoclassical 
environmental and resource economics modelling links between ecosystems and the economy.” In relation to 
Røpke’s first risk we focus more specifically on the relation of EE to mainstream methodology. 
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methodology as a toolbox that is useful in certain instances while being of no use (or even 
harmful) in others. We therefore maintain that EE is best served by a methodological pluralism 
that, in principle, does not preclude methods from mainstream economics.   
 
At this point, some clarification is necessary: what is actually mainstream economic 
methodology? In our view, it seems fair to define mainstream methodology as that which gets 
published in leading journals of the discipline. Flicking through any one of these journals seems 
to confirm Lawson’s (2006: 491) verdict that the “insistence on mathematical-deductive 
modelling” as an “essential feature of recent and current mainstream remains intact”. This 
methodological insistence on mathematical formalism is part of the overall paradigm of 
mainstream economics: following Kuhn (1962), a paradigm consists of the ensemble of values, 
methods and so forth, which is neither explicitly debated nor challenged in any way but taken for 
granted within a community. For instance, the normative theory of utilitarianism arguably 
constitutes another crucial element of the mainstream’s paradigm.3   
 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: we contrast two opposing lines of argument on 
mainstream methodology in Section 2 and then scrutinize them in Section 3. Against this 
background, Section 4 reviews a number of essential characteristics of EE, particularly its 
orientation towards sustainability problems, and lays out the concept of the “power of judgment” 
as a principle that prevents methodological pluralism from drifting toward arbitrariness. Section 5 
summarizes and draws conclusions.  
 
2. Two opposing views about mainstream economic methodology 
2.1. Line of argument I: Mainstream methodology is fundamentally flawed, so EE needs 
to be radically different from mainstream economics 
In a much-cited passage, Blaug (1997: 3) diagnosed mainstream economics with having an 
obsession for formal tools that distracts the discipline from addressing genuinely relevant 
questions: “Modern economics is sick. Economics has increasingly become an intellectual game 
played for its own sake and not for its practical consequences for understanding the economic 
world” (Blaug 1997: 3). Several critics contend that since Blaug’s diagnosis, nothing has really 
changed. In particular, “mathematical methods are being imposed in situations for which they are 
largely inappropriate” (Lawson 2006: 493), as the formal models employed seldom adequately 
reflect multilayered social systems.   
In order to fully appreciate this position we need to dig deeper here: what determines the 
(in)appropriateness of particular methods? Following Lawson (2003), a method is appropriate if 
it suits the nature of the phenomenon it is intended to analyze. This implies the assumption of an 
                                                          
3 Naturally, by indicating what counts as beyond debate within the mainstream, one enters contested terrain. For 
instance, mainstream economists often resort to strategies of self-immunization by referring to the diversity of 
strands within the discipline, thereby displaying “perverse resilience” (Green 2014). At the same time, some critics 
brush aside different currents within economics by pointing to a “neoclassicism” whose purported hyper-dominance 
transforms theoretical failure into discursive strength (Arnsperger and Varoufakis 2005). Against this background, 
we refrain from giving all-encompassing definitions and rather concentrate on the mainstream’s methodological 
focus. 
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objective reality which is to be approximated by scientific methods. Compared to the thoroughly 
instrumentalist stance of mainstream methodology (Friedman 1953), which favors usefulness 
over realism in models, Lawson thus performs an “ontological turn” (Lewis 2003): the reasons 
for approving or rejecting any given method are to be found in the structure of reality itself.  
So why has mainstream methodology, according to the ontological perspective, got it 
fundamentally wrong? Because the deductive-mathematical modeling it employs does not fit the 
actual structure of reality. Specifically, the prevailing kind of formalistic modeling is only 
appropriate for closed atomistic systems. Social phenomena in general should be presumed to 
derive from open, dynamic, interconnected and organic, structured and emergent systems. “In 
other words, the ontological presuppositions of these methods do not everywhere match the 
nature of social reality” (Lawson 2006: 502).  
Similarly, Anderson and M’Gonigle (2012) contend that mainstream methods are inappropriate 
for analyzing and solving the problems which EE addresses. They sense “a contradiction at the 
core of ecological economics, a contradiction between mainstream means and heterodox ends, 
with a confused space in between” (Anderson and M’Gonigle 2012: 39). Spash (2012: 41) 
perceives mainstream economics as a monist field of “close-minded formalists employing outdate 
behavioural psychology to defend an unrealistic position”.  
Based on this dire diagnosis, the critics’ recommendation is straightforward – EE should sever its 
links with mainstream economics and rely on alternative methods which better match social 
reality: “For example, in order for the old idea of a fully-informed, rational, atomistic agent to be 
replaced by the complex, fallible, multiply motivated agent requires dropping mathematical 
formalism, which acts as a constraint and perverts concepts” (Spash 2012: 41). In contrast, 
continued use of mainstream economic approaches is “detrimental to developing an alternative 
economic vision” (ibid.: 46).  
The very possibility of cooperating with mainstream economists is questioned as well. 
Collaborative work done by mainstream economists and ecological economists at Stockholm’s 
Beijer institute, for example, is cited as a failed attempt at cooperation, or worse, as an example 
of a hostile take-over of EE by mainstream economists (cf. Herman Daly’s comment cited in 
Røpke 2005: 272). In consequence, there seems to be no basis for collaborative work: “[…] 
rational debate with neoclassicists is a lost cause. It is as productive as asking a car mechanic to 
fix the engine's carbon-spewing exhaust by getting rid of the private automobile. [...] A 
reinvigorated ecological economics must leave behind the compromises of its history” (Anderson 
and M’Gonigle 2012: 39).  
In conclusion, this first line of argument contends that EE should abandon the bulk of mainstream 
methodology for ontological reasons and should rather strive for more radical concepts and 
methods that cannot be hijacked by mainstream economists. 
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2.2. Line of argument II: There is nothing inherently wrong with mainstream economic 
methodology – established concepts and methods can and should be routinely 
applied 
In 2012, the German Network for Pluralism in Economics addressed an open letter to the Verein 
für Socialpolitik (German Economics Association, GEA), criticizing the lack of pluralism (of 
theories and methods) in current mainstream research and teaching as well as its unquestioned 
acceptance of normative assumptions. In particular, the letter highlighted the mainstream’s 
tendency to treat mathematics as an end in itself instead of a mere tool – a practice which lends 
itself to concealing normative assumptions. The GEA’s (2013) answer to this letter may serve as 
a representative example of how many mainstream economists react to such criticisms. 
Identifying three reproaches, namely i) monist and dogmatic spirit within the discipline, ii) 
inappropriate focus on mathematical formalization and iii) intolerance against new approaches 
and methods, the GEA answered as follows. 
First, economics is not to be confused with an ideological belief in the self-regulating powers of 
the market. The aim of economics is to analyze the allocation of scarce resources; decentralized 
markets just happen to be the best allocation procedure. Second, formal modeling constitutes an 
important but not exclusive component of economic methodology. Since the problem of 
allocating scarce resources is first and foremost a quantitative one, formalization is indispensable 
in clarifying the choice between different alternatives. Third, the critics basically draw a 
caricature of economics. For instance, the alleged adherence to the homo oeconomicus as a 
distorted representation of human behavior is no longer (if it has ever been) correct: behavioral 
economics includes psychological research and previous standard assumptions such as logical 
consistency and interpersonal independence are steadily replaced. Furthermore, all models are, by 
definition, wrong; they are not intended to represent all aspects of reality. Instead, the point of 
models such as the homo oeconomicus is to structure our thoughts. 
Consequently, this second line of argument is confident that the mainstream’s toolbox of 
concepts, methods and instruments may be adequately applied to the kind of sustainability 
problems at the core of EE. Consider the case of climate change: van den Bergh (2012: 2) holds 
that internalizing all climate externalities would deliver sustainable climate policy – whether all 
existing externalities are taken into account “is not so much a conceptual-theoretical as a 
practical-empirical problem”. Although “the mainstream economic view on externality 
regulation is not accurate” (ibid.) in that it neglects complicating factors such as technological 
lock-in, taking these complications into account would suffice: “Without environmental 
externalities the problem of unsustainability vanishes” (van den Bergh 2010: 2051). From this 
perspective, then, formalistic methods developed to analyze these standard economic concepts 
are not problematic. In addition, this view comes very close to the mainstream’s line of defense 
that any deviation by real world environmental policy instruments from the economic textbook is 
not the latter’s fault (e.g. Sinn 2011). 
In sum, the second line of argument rejects the methodological critiques and emphasizes the 
applicability of mainstream concepts and methods to the issues relevant to EE. As regards the 
alleged inherent flaws of mainstream methodology, these either refer to dated models which have 
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been or are being rebuilt within the mainstream itself or else they relate to practical problems of 
implementation that are not conceptual problems per se.  
 
3. Evaluation  
3.1. Assessing line of argument I: The “ontological critique” of mainstream economic 
methodology is misleading 
Line of argument I rests on the premise that mainstream methodology is based on flawed 
ontological assumptions. In consequence, EE is advised to define and work with different 
assumptions, discarding mainstream methodology in toto. Should EE perform such an ontological 
turn? We disagree for three reasons. 
First, the idea of a readily available ontological consensus as a foundation for EE is questionable. 
Who is to determine the appropriateness of ontological views? Are we likely to agree on the 
“nature of reality” and appropriate perceptions thereof? Arguably there is no such consensus 
within EE. For instance, in order to achieve consensus on the claim that an ontological hierarchy 
exists, it is not sufficient to refer to the biophysical constraints of social life: while Spash (2012: 
42) argues in this way, he also cites Tacconi (1998: 99) who, in contrast, believes that “there are 
good reasons for adopting a relativist ontology”, albeit in a way that accounts for “biophysical 
limits to social life. However, these limits are interpreted differently by different actors”. In other 
words, while biophysical limits to human life represent one of the central tenets of EE, this does 
not necessarily translate into ontological consensus. To understand this, consider also the 
following statement by Røpke: “[T]here are limits to the material growth of the economy. It is a 
core belief that these limits have to be taken seriously and that several environmental problems 
are critical” (Røpke 2005: 267, emphasis in original). Røpke refers to a core belief – which has 
more to do with the researcher’s attitude than with an ontological assumption about the nature of 
reality. We will elaborate further on the characteristics of EE in Section 4 below.4 For the 
moment, the important point is that different philosophical stances are compatible with the core 
beliefs of EE: this may well include realism, constructivism and other, more specific 
philosophical attitudes (e.g. unrepresentative realism).   
 
Second, consensus on ontological questions is not sufficient for methodological consensus. 
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that there is an ontological consensus within EE, would that 
imply a consensus on methodological issues? This cannot be taken for granted. Indeed, van 
                                                          
4 The insistence on biophysical restrictions on economic activity has turned out to be a blunt weapon against 
mainstream myopia: the “Daly/Georgescu-Roegen vs. Solow/Stiglitz” debate from 1997 shows that economists do 
not deny biophysical restrictions as such. Instead, they tend to declare them irrelevant for the specific issues at hand. 
When pressured to declare whether he accepts the Second Law of Thermodynamics, Solow (1997: 268) answered: 
“No doubt everything is subject to the entropy law, but this is of no immediate practical importance for modeling 
what is, after all, a brief instant of time in a small corner of the universe”. So rather than putting forward the 
supposedly higher-ranking ontological status of the Second Law of Thermodynamics as compared to socially 
constructed norms, EE might do better to insist that, whatever its ontological status, the Second Law matters – right 
here, right now.  
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Bouwel (2003: 85) argues that one should beware of committing the “ontological fallacy: taking 
an a priori ontological stance which transposes or reduces epistemological and methodological 
matters into an ontological matter.” In other words, ontological considerations are not capable of 
providing us with “the right method” and neither can they function as a “final arbiter” in deciding 
methodological issues (Vromen 2009). Even if two researchers hold exactly the same convictions 
about ontological issues, they might nonetheless disagree about the particularities of a given case 
and therefore about the most appropriate method to apply. 
Third, consensus on ontological issues is not necessary for methodological consensus. Consider, 
for instance, two researchers, one a critical realist and the other a constructivist, who deeply 
disagree on the philosophical question “Is there one single objective reality?” At the same time, 
however, they may agree on a specific methodological issue. Assuming, for example, that both 
view climate change as a problem of intergenerational justice, both might criticize the 
mainstream approach of framing the problem as an exercise in discounting future costs and 
benefits; yet their agreement on how to conceptualize climate change does not exclude 
differences on the above-mentioned philosophical question. 
So far, we have argued that ontological differences should not overly concern us. Against this 
background, how are we to assess Lawson’s critique of mainstream methodology? Lawson 
contends that the formal models applied in mainstream economics do not match the social reality 
of complex, open systems, which the models are meant to approximate. At the same time he also 
carefully points out that he is not opposed to mathematical formalism per se. His critique is 
directed instead at the widespread “abuse” of such modeling, that is, its application for purposes 
considered as inappropriate. In fact, we fully agree with Lawson (2004: 337-339, cited in Lawson 
2009) when he writes: “[…] I do not suggest that formalistic methods be excluded for 
methodological options on offer. But I do insist that methods of mathematical-deductivist 
reasoning (like any other tools) have limits to their usefulness, and that this be recognized and 
respected”.  
The issue, then, is this: how are we to assess the usefulness of a method? While Lawson judges 
the appropriateness of a method by its capacity to precisely capture certain features of the real 
world, one might also hold a more instrumental view (cf., e.g., Reiss 2012a). From such a 
perspective, models are tools that derive their value from practical usefulness rather than 
representational accuracy. For instance, accepting the premise of social systems as open systems 
does not preclude the use of closed models “[…] to help understand an open reality” (Hodgson 
2009: 184). Indeed there is lively scholarly debate about the explanatory power of formal models 
(Reiss 2012b, 2013) and their general characteristics: formal economic models have been 
variously interpreted as metaphors (McCloskey 1983), as Galilean thought experiments 
(Cartwright 1999), as credible counterfactual worlds (Sugden 2000) and as heuristics (Hodgson 
2009).  
The gist of the preceding discussion is that reducing the evaluation of mainstream methodology 
to a high-level comparison with a predetermined set of ontological assumptions is extremely 
restrictive. Formal models may be considered useful in a variety of ways and EE would not do 
justice to the relevant methodological discussions (cf. Hausman 2012) by dismissing formal 
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economic modeling as inherently inadequate. Such a move, it should be recalled, would also run 
counter to Lawson’s own argument that formalistic methods should not be removed from our 
methodological inventory but should rather be recognized as limited in their usefulness. 
Moreover, as the next section makes clear, the reference to ontology is not required for a 
substantial critique of mainstream methodology.  
In sum, the thrust of argument I, which calls for a thoroughgoing methodological break between 
EE and mainstream economics, rests on a rather weak foundation. Even if mainstream 
methodology abuses formalistic methods, these methods might still be adequately applied in 
some contexts. The diagnosis that mainstream economics is obsessed does not entail the 
conclusion that mathematical formalism in EE should be avoided at all costs. Below we will 
argue that formal models may contribute to EE as long as they are not used as ends in themselves 
but serve a clear purpose.  
3.2. Assessing line of argument II: An instrumentalist critique of mainstream economic 
methodology  
In Section 3.1 we refuted the claim that mainstream methodology is to be rejected on ontological 
grounds. In the following, we demonstrate that from an instrumentalist perspective there is still 
substantial reason to criticize mainstream methodology. In doing so, we show that a critique of 
mainstream methodology need not necessarily be aligned with particular philosophical 
assumptions. Since Friedman’s (1953) famous methodological essay is often invoked as that 
seminal piece of work which underlies mainstream practice, we proceed by reviewing how its 
two main claims relate to our overall assessment. These claims are: i) a theory should be judged 
by its predictive value and not by the realism of its assumptions and ii) “[…] positive economics 
is, or can be, an ʻobjectiveʼ science, in precisely the same sense as any of the physical sciences” 
(Friedman 1953: 4). 
First, formalization in economics has become an end in itself rather than a tool. We tap only very 
briefly into the vast literature that substantiates this claim. For instance, Mirowski (1989) dissects 
the neoclassical obsession with transforming economics into a “social physics” via copying 
mathematical methods from 19th century physics. Another example from within mainstream 
economics itself is Ellison’s (2002) model, where peer review procedures create and perpetuate a 
trend towards formalization: referees’ comments mostly focus on improving the technical aspects 
of a submitted paper rather than considering the relevance of its research question. In 
consequence, economists spend ever more time polishing the mathematical finesse of their work 
at the expense of developing relevant research questions. Ultimately, the key piece of evidence 
comes from Friedman himself, who complained that “[e]conomics has increasingly become an 
arcane branch of mathematics” (Friedman 1999: 137). That Friedman should write this is 
somewhat ironic given that he himself may have contributed to this development:5  
                                                          
5 There is no consensus on this question; see the discussion in Hands (2003). 
9 
 
“Friedman's methodological views […] still serve as a way of avoiding awkward 
questions concerning simplifications, idealizations, and abstraction in economics rather 
than responding to them” (Hausman 2012). 
Importantly, the fact that Friedman’s arguments have been used by many economists as a 
legitimation for engaging in empty formalism does not imply that a particular ontological stance 
(=realist, non-instrumentalist) is necessary for criticizing mainstream practice. On the contrary, 
judging the appropriateness of formal models by their practical usefulness will often lead to the 
conclusion that mainstream work does not live up to its own alleged methodological standards 
(cf. Reiss 2012a: 380). The very point of instrumentalism is to value a given model or theory by 
assessing its capacity to explain or help us understand something or simply to structure our 
thoughts in novel and better ways – and these functions cannot be completely detached from the 
plausibility of assumptions. In sum, mainstream methodology, by transforming formalistic 
modeling into an end in itself, actually opposes the thrust of instrumentalism. 
Second, the mainstream’s stance towards normativity is questionable. Since the very beginnings, 
a tendency to switch attitudes can be observed: “As far back as Gossen, neoclassicals have 
wavered between claiming that they were describing actual behavior and claiming that they were 
prescribing what rational behavior should be” (Mirowski 1989: 236). The tendency to sidestep 
critique by shifting between different points of view is combined with and facilitated by an 
adherence to a strict fact-value dichotomy, as proposed by Friedman (1953). The claim is that 
economics can separate the positive analysis of how people behave from the normative question 
of how they should behave (e.g. which policies to implement in order to maximize social 
welfare). It seems plain to us, however, that these two dimensions cannot be neatly separated and 
that “moral entanglements” are inescapable (Sen 1987, Sandel 2013). 
Let us illustrate this argument by examining the concepts of efficiency and externality. 
Mainstream economics concentrates on Pareto efficiency of allocations and routinely implies that 
everyone should support efficiency enhancing measures regardless of their specific value 
judgments because the former simply increase overall welfare. However, as demonstrated by Le 
Grand (1990: 560), efficiency is “a secondary objective that only acquires meaning with 
reference to primary objectives”. The problem is that a vaguely normative use of efficiency may 
serve to occlude alternative (e.g. non-utilitarian) perspectives, so a disclosure of underlying 
primary (normative) objectives is vital (cf. Strunz 2012).  
Externality is a descriptive concept; the internalization of externalities yields allocative 
efficiency. But sustainability is more than internalization of externalities (Baumgärtner and 
Quaas 2010, Common 2011): sustainability is a normative concept that is built on considerations 
of justice towards current and future generations and justice between humans and nature 
(Baumgärtner and Quaas 2008). Consequently, reducing sustainability to thin concepts such as 
internalization of externalities or non-declining utility is problematic (cf. Howarth 2007). 
In sum, we argue that the above-mentioned critique voiced by the Network for Pluralism in 
Economics (2012) is justified: mainstream methodology treats formalism as an end in itself and 
this inclination naturally lends itself to glossing over normative assumptions. Who would oppose 
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an allocation that was quantitatively proven to be more efficient? Who would not support the 
internalization of environmental externalities? However, formalization may obfuscate the 
inherent normativity of concepts such as “efficiency” and “sustainability”. 
3.3 Interim conclusion 
Summing up, we deem neither of the opposing lines of argument convincing. First, regarding the 
ontological critique of mainstream methodology, we do not propose that questions concerning the 
fundamental vision of EE should remain unaddressed. However, we do believe that it is wrong to 
consider answers to ontological questions as a priori presuppositions from which all 
epistemological and methodological assumptions then ensue. Such an attitude has been referred 
to as the “ontological fallacy” (Van Bouwel 2003). Researchers should make their perspectives 
on humans and nature explicit – but these pre-analytic commitments can only serve as a first 
heuristic step in research processes (Vromen 2009). As a result, mainstream methodology cannot 
be “rejected” or “approved” as a whole. Second, mainstream methodology exhibits a problematic 
attitude towards formalism and normativity. On the one hand, EE would therefore be ill advised 
to copy mainstream concepts and methods without duly scrutinizing their applicability. On the 
other hand, mainstream methodology itself is evolving, particularly in the area of empirical 
economics (cf. Angrist and Pischke 2010). Therefore, we contend that there is no inherent 
obstacle to accommodating mainstream approaches within EE’s methodological repertoire.  
4. Judging the appropriateness of methods within Ecological Economics 
4.1. Ecological Economics as a problem-oriented scientific movement  
In many traditional scientific disciplines, including mainstream economics, what is regarded as a 
valid scientific problem is usually defined from inside the scientific community and judged 
against standards that are intrinsic to that discipline, for example the use or development of 
certain methodologies (Kuhn 1962). In contrast to this EE was, from its very beginnings, oriented 
towards tackling problems stemming from outside the scientific realm. That is, societal needs and 
demands are a relevant – if not the most relevant – source for defining a valid problem within EE. 
Moreover, these problems are normative ones. Costanza (1991) emphasized these issues by 
entitling his early compilation of founding contributions “Ecological Economics: The science and 
management of sustainability”. Interestingly, Costanza characterized EE not only as a science but 
also as a certain practice for coping with sustainability problems. In other words, 
transdisciplinarity (Pohl and Hirsch Hadorn 2007) and an orientation towards sustainability 
problems can be considered to be constitutional characteristics of EE. 
Following this argument, the use of a specific methodology or an assemblage of methodologies is 
not an appropriate way of demarcating EE from mainstream economics or constructively defining 
it (cf. Baumgärtner et al. 2008). Similarly to other problem-oriented applied sciences such as the 
engineering sciences, medical science, and jurisprudence, the methods employed need to match 
the real-world problems to be tackled. Thus the benchmark against which a certain methodology 
should be judged is its usefulness or appropriateness for understanding, analyzing or solving the 
specific sustainability problem at hand. In order to describe the traits of EE, then, it is necessary 
to explore the characteristics of sustainability problems.  
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4.2. Characteristics of sustainability problems 
Obviously sustainability encompasses a huge variety of issues. Nevertheless, it is possible to 
identify typical characteristics of sustainability problems. Following Faber (2008) and Klauer et 
al. (2013; 2013a: 55) a number of key points can be identified that, notwithstanding differences in 
detail, the various approaches to conceptualizing and operationalizing sustainability have in 
common:  
- At the heart of sustainability is a demand for intra- and intergenerational justice. It 
addresses the fact that the way people (above all in the prosperous countries) currently 
live and work leads to serious problems over the long term. Many of the adverse 
consequences of our way of life are already distributed unequally within our current 
generation, but future generations in particular will also be affected by them.    
- Long-term perspective: Sustainability implies that the long-term effects of today’s actions 
are a key criterion for assessing policy options. This follows from the demand for 
intergenerational justice. 
- Comprehensive and integrated approach: Problems relating to sustainability need to be 
assessed in a comprehensive and integrated manner rather than from a sector-based 
perspective alone.  
- Preserving nature: Most concepts of sustainability share the idea that the quality of what 
is bequeathed to succeeding generations must satisfy certain requirements, in particular, 
that a specific quality standard of nature needs to be preserved. Occasionally there are 
also calls to acknowledge an intrinsic value of nature, that is, a moral value that is 
independent of nature’s usefulness to human beings. 
These features of sustainability entail a number of consequences for EE. It is necessary to deal 
with complexity, uncertainty and ignorance. The knowledge base for tackling sustainability 
problems has to be broad, encompassing scientific knowledge from different disciplines as well 
as practical and idiosyncratic knowledge. Methodological pluralism is welcome, if not necessary. 
As a consequence EE should be inter- and transdisciplinary by nature (cf. Pohl and Hirsch 
Hadorn 2007). In other words, EE itself is not a normal discipline defined strictly by its own 
paradigm in the sense of Kuhn (1962) but rather a post-normal science (Funtowicz and Ravetz 
1993): it is not characterized by a consistent, clearly defined set of assumptions, approaches and 
methods. Rather, EE is characterized by its object: sustainability problems. Nevertheless, the way 
these problems are addressed should be scientific in a general sense – that is, method-based, 
communicable and intersubjective.  
How can these methodological challenges imposed by the nature of sustainability problems be 
tackled in an appropriate manner? Decisions on the appropriateness of a method for addressing a 
sustainability problem are thoroughly context-dependent. There is no one-method-fits-all 
solution. In our view, the key concept here is the power of judgment as systematically expounded 
by Immanuel Kant (2000 [1790]).  
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4.3.  Power of judgment  
The power of judgment is the capacity to apply general concepts and insights to specific, 
contingent situations (for the following discussion, see also Klauer et al. 2013, 2013a). It is a 
crucial step in all kinds of decision making but is needed even at the stage of recognizing, for 
example, an object that consists of a trunk and branches as “a tree”. Judgment is needed to 
distinguish between relevant and irrelevant knowledge and to apply abstract scientific findings to 
real-world problems. Kant argued that the power of judgment proceeds by starting out from 
something specific and reflecting on the general type(s) under which it can be subsumed. The 
power of judgment incorporates two complementary elements, namely, “heuristics” and 
“intuition”:  
– Heuristics: Judgment does not deduce but seeks and finds, i.e. it proceeds heuristically 
(Ancient Greek: heuriskein = to find). When seeking a good solution to a problem a 
heuristic offers rules of thumb and guiding principles for orientation. In contrast to 
scientific laws that are subject to the idea of general validity, the rules and principles of a 
heuristic allow for (some) exceptions: “The exception proves the rule.” We call such 
guiding principles and rules “bridging principles” because they relate specific situations to 
general laws, scientific knowledge and the like (cf. Albert 1991, Klauer et al. 2013: Sec. 
7.6.2). A heuristic is a system of bridging principles that constitute a method for seeking 
solutions.  
– Intuition: It is not sufficient to have a heuristic; its proper application is crucial. Judgment 
demands a feeling for the situation. By ‘feeling’ we do not mean an emotion but rather a 
sense or intuition, as in the phrase “My feeling is that something is amiss.” Intuition offers 
us a vague idea of what to do when reason fails to provide clear advice. Admittedly such 
intuitions may be unreliable and deceptive. However, while experienced scouts can rely 
on their sense of direction, greenhorns may get lost even if they have a map. A sense of 
orientation additionally needs practice and experience. Some talent is needed too. Because 
intuition is based on talent as well as experience it remains subjective and vague.   
The power of judgment is a capacity – a characteristic trait of an individual (Kant 2000 [1790]: 
99, 100, §8; Oakeshott 1991: 15). Nevertheless there are two factors that make judgment 
objective to a certain degree:  
1. Kant argues (2000 [1790]: 173, 174, §40) that a person making a decision knows that it is 
a personal decision she is making. In order to ensure that her decision is the right one, she 
seeks dialogue with others, hoping that they will agree with her. However, she can only 
expect agreement if she has tried to anticipate and consider the views of others 
beforehand. By adopting the perspective of others, a certain “intersubjectivity” enters the 
decision making process.  
2. The bridging principles mentioned above bring to judgment a second aspect of 
objectiveness: their applicability and usefulness can be communicated and debated among 
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a group of people involved in making a decision. Agreement on their helpfulness 
indicates a degree of objectivity.  
4.4. Power of judgment and EE 
So how can judgment help us in deciding whether or not some economic concept or method is 
appropriate? According to the procedure outlined above, exercising judgment in order to assess 
the appropriateness of a given economic method means applying criteria to specific situations. As 
it turns out, relevant criteria have already been proposed. For instance, the difference between 
relative and absolute scarcity separates the realm of economic methodology from a realm in 
which standard economic concepts are not appropriate (Baumgärtner et al. 2006). Focusing on 
the example of biodiversity and its conservation, the authors show that the divide between 
relative and absolute scarcity runs right through this issue. On the one hand, biodiversity 
conservation deals with relative scarcity, in that each conservation policy carries opportunity 
costs; hence economic methods are useful to ensure the non-wastefulness of policies. On the 
other hand, biodiversity is partly characterized by non-substitutability and multi-functionality, 
which rules out the application of economic approaches. It is crucial to appreciate that the 
watershed between both realms is not objectively given: the necessary distinction is “impossible 
to make solely on objective grounds” (Baumgärtner et al. 2006: 495) because it involves 
subjective value judgments. Similarly, Kallis et al. (2013) argue that the question of whether the 
monetary valuation of nature is acceptable cannot be usefully answered in a universal way. 
Instead, the authors “propose a reformulation of the question into ‘when and how to value 
money?’ and ‘under what conditions’” (ibid.: 97). To that end they lay out a decision framework 
consisting of four criteria under which a monetary valuation of nature is admissible 
(environmental improvement, distributive justice, plural value-articulating institutions, no 
neoliberal commodification). Obviously, these criteria derive from very specific value judgments; 
also, there is no objective way to decide whether some measure can be expected to meet a given 
condition. In conclusion, the appropriateness of economic methods must be resolved for specific 
contexts, following more general criteria and guiding principles. The involved value judgments 
should be made explicit. 
The inherent subjectivity of judgment, then, should not lead us to fear a relativist nightmare 
where methodological decisions are based purely on idiosyncratic whims: the power of judgment 
comprises an intersubjective dimension, which implies discursive rationality (Schnädelbach 
1998). In other words, meaningful methodological debate is possible because researchers need to 
justify their decisions by offering reasons for why they adhere to some particular belief. This 
procedure of giving reasons for the beliefs one entertains has been referred to as “volitional 
pragmatism” (Bromley 2008). Thus addressing methodological problems by means of the power 
of judgment might be interpreted as a pragmatic route forward for EE.  
To sum up, EE should not be defined by the use or rejection of certain methods but by (i) a focus 
on sustainability problems and (ii) the way these problems are conceptualized. This includes 
acknowledging the specific characteristics of sustainability problems such as complexity, 
uncertainty (cf. Faber et al. 1992, 1998, Sigel et al. 2010) and long-term dynamics (cf. Faber et 
al. 2005, Fischer et al. 2014) while also acknowledging that such problems occur in emergent 
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systems that are open, dynamic, interconnected, organic and structured. It also entails 
maintaining a degree of openness towards methods and approaches from other disciplines and 
incorporating different perspectives on nature and human beings as well as their respective 
normative foundations (Klauer et al. 2013, 2013a).  
5. Conclusion 
It has been claimed that EE risks being absorbed by mainstream environmental economics. EE 
would be rendered irrelevant in that the mainstream keeps on dominating public discourse with 
policy advice based on neoclassical assumptions: “If ecological economics is to have a future 
worth having, its real contribution will surely lie in both dismantling the hegemony of 
neoclassical economics and in helping to move to a post-hegemonic (post-capitalist) exploration 
of what can and must take its place” (Anderson and M’Gonigle 2012: 43). We agree that the 
dominance of neoclassical economics should be overcome. However, this does not imply an 
outright rejection of every concept and method that originates from the mainstream. We believe 
that the severity of sustainability problems will slowly but surely diminish the hegemony of 
neoclassical economics and will advance the prominence of EE. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile 
pointing out the mainstream’s ideological blind spots. Indeed, EE’s explicit normative foundation 
– its focus on sustainability – can be positively employed to demarcate EE from allegedly neutral 
economics. In contrast to neoclassical environmental economists’ denial of an explicit ethical 
stance, EE scholars do actively address ethical questions. Ilge and Schwarze’s (2009) empirical 
investigation demonstrates that a recognizable EE “school of thought” that is distinct from 
environmental economics has already developed.  
Our methodological perspective also has implications for the question of the extent to which 
standard economic instruments may be advocated: decisions must be context-based because 
universal answers are not available. For instance, there are many examples where markets or 
economic instruments erode moral norms (e.g. Bowles 2008, Falk and Szech 2013), so a societal 
debate about their specific appropriateness is needed (Sandel 2012). However, this does not 
imply that economic instruments are essentially immoral and have no place within a policy mix 
for sustainability in general or biodiversity and ecosystem governance in particular, to refer to the 
above-mentioned example of biodiversity conservation (Vatn et al. 2011). From an evolutionary 
perspective (Ring 1997), policies may well include economic instruments so as to foster 
sustainability in the long run – even if the “internalization of externalities” is not sufficient 
conceptually (cf. Section 3.2).    
Let us return to the metaphor introduced in our title. In Homer’s Odyssey, Circe counsels 
Odysseus to sail closer to Scylla because it is “better by far to lose six men and keep your ship 
than to lose your entire crew”. Accordingly, two questions arise: First, is there a way for EE to 
pass through the strait without incurring damage? We hope that this can be answered 
affirmatively, having pointed out the possibilities of determining the (non-)applicability of 
economic methods in different contexts. Second, which strategy risks more seriously damaging 
EE – eschewing mainstream economic methods and concepts as such (in order to separate EE 
from economics) or routinely adopting mainstream economic methods (in order to change 
economics from the inside)? Of course, the answer to this question will depend on a person’s 
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subjective valuation and judgment. But it is precisely because this dependence on values exists in 
the context of decision making that we insist there is an appropriate place for mainstream 
economic methods within the methodological diversity of EE. We doubt that conducting a kind 
of methodological cleansing would have a beneficial impact. Rather, EE might benefit from 
different perspectives because “there is a tremendous dynamic energy found in embracing the 
tensions of our unique location” (Nelson 2009: 7). Ultimately, the decisive criterion for whether 
or not a given economic method should be used is its suitability in tackling the sustainability 
problem at hand. It is the scientist’s power of judgment that endorses the selection of methods 
and prevents methodological pluralism from drifting toward arbitrariness.  
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